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I. INTRODUCTION

"[W]e are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees
by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with
their group .

. . ."

Since Justice Brennan spoke these words in the

landmark Supreme Court decision of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, finding
that employers may not consider sex stereotypes when making employment
decisions, sex discrimination cases have emerged under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") in various contexts. 2 The fastest
growing area of Title VII cases in recent years has been in family
1. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251, 256-58 (1989) (plurality
opinion) (finding that comments indicating sex stereotyping in an employment decision
are evidence of sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964).
2. See, e.g., Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1106 (9th Cir.
2006) (en banc) (holding that a casino employer's appearance policy, which required
female bartenders to wear makeup at all times, was not a discriminatory practice based
on sex stereotypes); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 575 (6th Cir. 2004) (ruling
that discrimination against a transsexual firefighter who exhibited a feminine
appearance at work was sex stereotyping in violation of Title VII).
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responsibility discrimination, a cause of action derived from the theory of
sex discrimination based on gender-role stereotypes.3 These cases most
often arise when an employer discriminates against employees with
children. In such cases, the employer makes employment-based decisions
on the assumption than an employee-parent is less committed to her work
because of her family responsibilities.4
One case, however, filed in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania centers around employer actions driven
by strikingly different assumptions. This employer suggested to a female
employee that her priorities were out of order because she was too
committed to her job after having children. Attorney Alyson Kirleis, a
married mother of two young sons, filed suit against her law firm, Dickie,
McCamey & Chilcote ("DMC"), alleging, among other things, that she was
told she needed to spend less time at work and more time tending to her
family responsibilities at home. 5 So far, DMC has filed a motion to dismiss
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, which the court denied, and then
moved for a stay of proceedings to appeal the denial of the motion to
dismiss, which the court also denied.6 This is a significant case in terms of
feminist theory because Kirleis essentially challenges the gender norms
associated with the "ideal worker" 7 in society by continuing with her
previously demanding work schedule even after having two children. In
spite of her strong work performance, Kirleis encountered the "maternal
3. See Joan C. Williams & Stephanie Bornstein, Caregivers in the Courtroom:
The Growing Trend of Family Responsibility Discrimination,21 U.S.F. L. REv. 171,

171-72 (2006) (citing a nearly four hundred percent increase in family responsibility
discrimination cases in the last ten years, as compared to the previous decade).

4. See MARY C. STILL, CTR. FOR WORKLIFE LAW, LITIGATING THE MATERNAL
WALL: U.S. LAWSUITS CHARGING DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WORKERS WITH FAMILY

RESPONSIBILITIES 4 (2006), http://www.worklifelaw.org/pubs/FRDreport.pdf (reporting
that most family responsibility discrimination lawsuits involve both men and women
employees who fulfill typical caregiving roles at home).
5. See Jason Cato, Lawyer Sues Her Downtown Firm, PITT. TRIB.-REV., Nov. 11,
2006 (describing how the law firm was openly hostile to female lawyers); G.M.
Filisko, Lawyer Says She Was Shoved onto the Mommy Track, ABA J. E-REP., Dec. 1,
2006,
http://www.womensrightsny.com/blawg/archive/discrimination/sex/index.html
(last visited May 28, 2009).
6. See Kirleis v. Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, P.C., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
75996, at *9-10 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 12, 2007) (denying defendant's motion to stay

proceedings pending appeal of court's earlier denial of motion to dismiss because the
appeal was frivolous in light of defendant's failure to set forth a prima facie case that
an agreement between parties to arbitrate existed); Kirleis v. Dickie, McCamey &
Chilcote, P.C., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53542, at *16 (W.D. Pa. July 24, 2007) (finding
that plaintiff was an employee of defendant under the applicable statutes, regardless of
shareholder status, and thus denying defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint on
that ground).
7. See JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER 1, 69-72 (Oxford Univ. Press 2000)
(coining this term to describe the type of worker employers want to hire and retain for
high-caliber jobs: one who works full-time, overtime and takes little or no time off for
career interruptions related to childbearing or child rearing duties).
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wall" when categorized by her employer as an attorney-mother
who could
8
not possibly fulfill both of her roles successfully.
II. BACKGROUND

This article will analyze the possible success of Kirleis's case using two
different approaches to trying a claim of sex or family responsibility
discrimination under Title VII. In Part II, this article introduces the
background of Title VII sex-based family responsibility discrimination
claims and traces the development of the two theories this article will
analyze-sex stereotyping and harassment amounting to a hostile work
environment. 9 Additionally, Part II discusses the facts that gave rise to
Kirleis filing a discrimination suit against her employer, DMC. Part III
parses the facts from Kirleis's complaint using cases decided under each of
the two Title VII theories introduced in Part II, and projects the likely
success of Kirleis in her lawsuit under each approach.' ° Part III also
discusses the possible implications of the Kirleis case for future sex-based
family responsibility claims by female employees. Specifically, Part III
discusses the attention this case will bring to this area of the law and the
likelihood that it will empower similarly situated career women and men
with children to challenge employer discrimination. This Part will also
explore how this case may compel prominent employers to reconsider
current employment practices and policies. Part IV discusses relevant
feminist theory and the significance of Kirleis's case, especially the fact
that she performed as an ideal worker and still encountered discrimination
based on the phenomenon of the maternal wall.11 Furthermore, Part IV
analyzes how the case should fit into a theoretical feminist analysis and
argues that the strategy utilized to find workable solutions to avoid similar
cases in the future should combine the approaches of both liberal and
individualist feminism. To come to this conclusion, Part IV parses some of
the five opening "moves" used by feminist legal theorists throughout the
decades to approach legal issues from a feminist perspective.1 2 Finally,
8. See id.at 70 (noting that the maternal wall stops many women before they even
reach a glass ceiling in their careers, and that all women, not just those who already
have children, are affected by the assumption that motherhood precludes women from
performing as ideal workers).
9. See infra Part II (explaining that sex stereotyping includes both prescriptive and
descriptive stereotyping and that assessing a hostile work environment requires both an
objective and subjective analysis).
10. See infra Part III (arguing that Kirleis should have success under both sex
stereotyping and hostile work environment theories).
11. See infra Part IV (discussing the challenges posed by the theoretical concepts
of the "maternal wall" and the "double bind").
12. See MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 4-13
(2d ed. 2003) (describing the five opening moves to analyze legal issues "like a
feminist" as: women's experience, implicit male bias, double binds and dilemmas of
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Part V concludes that the district court should decide Kirleis v. Dickie,
McCamey & Chicote in Kirleis's favor and reiterates what the outcome of
this case might mean for future cases if the district court decides for the
plaintiff, or in the alternative, for the defendant.
A. The Development of Family Responsibility Causes of Action Under Title
VII on a Theory of Sex Discrimination
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits any employer from
taking action to "discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.," 3 Thus, with
the passage of Title VII, Congress declared that "sex, race, religion, and
national origin are not relevant to the selection, evaluation, or
compensation of employees. 14 Based upon the prohibition of using sex as
a characteristic in employment decisions, the Supreme Court created a new
doctrine for bringing Title VII claims in Phillips v. Martin Marietta
5 In that case, the Court held that an employer could not have
Corporation.1
different hiring policies
for men and women, both of whom may have pre6
children.'
school-age
Out of this first case, which deemed gender-role stereotypes as
impermissible discrimination when unrelated to job performance, grew a
phenomenon that is known today as family responsibility discrimination, or
FRD. FRD is a case theory under Title VII that employees use to sue their
employers for discriminating against them because of their caregiving
responsibilities at home.' 7 "Although federal equal employment laws do
not prohibit discrimination against caregivers per se," there are various
circumstances in which courts can find this type of discrimination to be
unlawful.' 8 Plaintiffs bring FRD lawsuits under numerous statutory
difference, reproducing patterns of male dominance, and unpacking women's choices).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2000).
14. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(recognizing that the statute does not limit the other qualities that employers may take

into account).
15. See 400 U.S. 542, 542-43 (1971) (deciding the case of an employer who
informed a female applicant that it was not accepting job applications from women
with pre-school-age children).
16. See id. at 543-44 (finding that the case could not stand on sex discrimination
alone because seventy-five to eighty percent of those hired for the position were
women).
17. See Tresa Baldas, EEOC Looks at CaregiverBias, NAT'L L. J. (May 29, 2007)
(discussing the rise in FRD cases that prompted the EEOC to distribute guidelines to
employers on how to avoid liability).
18. See, e.g., EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, ENFORCEMENT
GUIDANCE:

UNLAWFUL

RESPONSIBILITIES

(May

DISPARATE

TREATMENT OF WORKERS

WITH CAREGIVING

23, 2007), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/
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schemes, including Title VII, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, the
Family Medical Leave Act, Equal Pay Act, and the Americans with
Disabilities Act.' 9 This article focuses on two theories under Title VII to
bring an FRD or "sex plus" discrimination lawsuit.
1. Sex andFamily ResponsibilityDiscriminationCases Based on GenderRole Stereotypes Under Title VII
Title VII does not allow employers to treat female workers less favorably
merely on the assumption that a particular female employee, by incidence
of sex, will assume caretaking responsibilities, or that a female worker's
caretaking responsibilities will interfere with her work performance or
decrease her competence on the job. 20 Employment decisions based on
stereotypes that female caregivers should not, will not, or cannot be
committed to their jobs after having children, or because they might have
children, are sex-based and violate Title VII. 21 Many employees sue their
employers because they are denied opportunities based on assumptions
about how they might balance work and family responsibilities. When
employers make adverse employment decisions originating from such sexbased assumptions or speculation, rather than on the specific work
performance of a particular employee, they violate Title VII. 22 Even
"benevolent" stereotyping is illegal under Title VII. For example, an
employer, even acting with the best of intentions, is not allowed to deny a
another city because he assumes
mother a promotion to a better position2 in
3
she will not want to relocate her family.
The sex-stereotyping cases, for the purposes of Title VII, began with the
Supreme Court's decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, where the Court
docs/caregiving.html [hereinafter EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE] (providing
guidance to employers on the circumstances that can give rise to lawsuits by employees
on the basis of family responsibility discrimination).
19. See id. (specifying the relevance of various statutes to FRD claims); Baldas,
supra note 17 (describing the fear among employers that guidance by the EEOC on
FRD cases would open up more claims under a new protected class within the Title VII
statutory scheme).
20. See, e.g., Lust v. Sealy, Inc., 383 F.3d 580, 583 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding a jury's
determination that Lust was passed over for a promotion because she was a woman
reasonable when her supervisor admitted he did not consider her for the better position
at a different office because she had children and he assumed she would not want to
relocate her family).
21. See EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 18, at I.B (explaining that
working mothers should be evaluated as individuals rather than as members of a
group).
22. See id. at II.A.3 (noting that employment decisions that are based on actual

work performance are not violations of Title VII).
23. See Lust, 383 F.3d at 583 (acknowledging that while mothers are often more
sensitive to relocating their families than are fathers, antidiscrimination laws entitle
each person to be evaluated as an individual).
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concluded that, in passing Title VII, Congress intended to target the entire
spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex
stereotypes.2 4 The Court acknowledged that actionable stereotyping can be
based on either an assumption by an employer that a woman will act a
particular way or that she ought to act in a certain way. 25 For instance, in
Price Waterhouse, plaintiff Ann Hopkins was denied a promotion because
she was stereotyped negatively by her superiors for lacking feminine
character traits and for acting too aggressively.26
Stereotyping by
employers can take two forms: descriptive and prescriptive. Descriptive
stereotyping occurs when an employer has untested assumptions about
what a mother wants or how she will behave at work.27 Prescriptive
stereotyping occurs when an employer seeks to prescribe how a particular
group, such as working mothers, should behave. 28 Ann Hopkins was a
victim of prescriptive stereotyping when her superiors took negative action
against her in the workplace because they believed she should act less
aggressively and carry herself more quietly around the office.
One example of descriptive stereotyping that followed almost ten years
after the groundbreaking decision in Price Waterhouse dealt with an
employer's assumptions about what employment choices an employee
would make in light of the fact that she had children. 9 In Trezza v.
Hartford, Inc., an employer denied the plaintiff, a female attorney with
children, a promotion and instead gave it to an unmarried woman with no
children.3 ° When the plaintiff inquired as to why the firm did not consider
her for the position, the managing attorneys told her that they assumed she
24. See 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (plurality opinion) (finding that when an
employer objects to aggressiveness in females, but requires it for a certain job position,
that employer violates Title VII by discriminating on the basis of sex stereotypes). But
see Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc)
(concluding that casino employer's policy requiring women, and not men, to wear
makeup to work was permissible given the lack of stereotypical intent and equal
treatment of all employees under the applicable grooming standards).
25. See, e.g., Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 543-44 (1971)
(deciding that it was unlawful for an employer who employed men with pre-school-age
children to refuse applications from similarly situated women); see also JOAN C.
WILLIAMS & CYNTHIA THOMAS CALVERT, CTR. FOR WORKLIFE LAW, WORKLIFE LAW'S

GUIDE TO FAMILY RESPONSIBILITIES DISCRIMINATION 1-31 to -32 (2006) (discussing
Price Waterhouse as an example of gender-based stereotyping because the employer
believed that a female employee should not act aggressively at work and instead should
display the "more feminine" trait of passivity).
26. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235 (noting that her employers advised her
to walk and talk more femininely, and to wear makeup and jewelry).
27. See WILLIAMS & CALVERT, supra note 25, at 1-32.

28. See id.
29. See Trezza v. Hartford, Inc., 1998 WL 912101, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 1998)
(finding that the plaintiff was told by a managing attorney that she was not considered
for promotion because of assumptions made regarding her caregiving responsibilities).
30. See id. (noting that the plaintiff was "in line for" promotion).
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would not be interested in the position because she had children and the
position involved traveling during the week. The court held that plaintiffs
claims of discrimination should not be dismissed because she put forth
evidence of descriptive stereotyping and sex discrimination under Title VII
by showing that the employer made an assumption, without asking about
her preferences, that she would choose to turn down the promotion instead
of traveling away from her family during the week.3'
Yet another example of descriptive stereotyping emerged more recently
in Lust v. Sealy, Inc. where an employer made the mistake of assuming a
female employee with children would not want to relocate her family. 32 In
Lust, the employer admitted to the court that he did not consider Lust for a
transfer to a better position at another office because she had children and
he did not think she would want to relocate her family.33 The court held
that the antidiscrimination laws entitle individuals to be evaluated as
individuals rather than as members of groups having certain average
34
characteristics.
Finally, in an equal protection case involving prescriptive stereotyping,

the Second Circuit held that a claim brought by an elementary school
psychologist asserting that family responsibility discrimination resulted in
her termination did not require comparative evidence.35 The court stated
that "stereotypical remarks about the incompatibility of motherhood and
employment [based on an employer's assumptions about how a working
mother should act] 'can certainly be evidence that gender played a part' in
an employment decision ...."36 All of these cases are significant because

they show illegal prescriptive and descriptive stereotypes at work through

31. See id. at *6 (quoting Arnett v. Aspin, 846 F. Supp. 1234, 1240 (E.D. Pa.
1994)) (finding that "the point behind the establishment of the sex-plus discrimination
theory... is to allow Title VII plaintiffs to survive summary judgment when the
defendant employer does not discriminate against all members of the sex."); see also
WILLIAMS & CALVERT, supra note 25, at 1-32 (citing Trezza as an example of a
descriptive stereotyping case).
32. See 383 F.3d 580, 582-83 (7th Cir. 2004) (concluding that the jury verdict
finding Sealy guilty of discrimination for passing up Lust for the promotion based on
gender stereotypes reasonable because if the plaintiff offers evidence of her own, the
jury is free to disbelieve the defendant's contrary evidence).
33. See id.at 583 (noting that Lust had never told her boss that she did not want to
relocate her family).
34. See id.(explaining that if she would have been treated as an individual she
would not have lost the opportunity for the promotion).
35. See Back v. Hastings-on-Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 122 (2d
Cir. 2004) (finding, specifically, that evidence of a high percentage of women
employed by the school, and the high percentage of those women having children, is
not sufficient to defeat a claim of FRD).
36. See id. (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989))
(declaring that "stereotyping of women as caregivers can by itself and without more be
evidence of an impermissible, sex-based motive").
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examples of faulty assumptions by employers about what certain females
want at work or how they should act on the job. The courts in all of these
cases decided that assumptions about the incompatibility of aggressiveness
in females and motherhood with success at work are unlawful forms of sexbased employment discrimination.
2. Sex and Family Responsibility DiscriminationCases Based on Hostile
Work Environment Under Title VII
In addition to theories of illegal stereotypes in the workplace, sex and
family responsibility discrimination cases can also be brought under the
theory that the employer created a hostile work environment through
discriminatory actions.37 To prevail on a hostile environment claim, a
plaintiff must establish harassment "sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to
alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive
working environment."' '38 The Supreme Court articulated this type of
claim for sex discrimination in the outrageous case of an employee
suffering harassment at the hands of her supervisor in Meritor Savings
Bank v. Vinson.3 9 There, a bank teller claimed that her supervisor
repeatedly asked her to engage in sexual intercourse with him, fondled her
in front of other employees, and forcibly raped her on several occasions. 40
In announcing the standard for hostile work environment harassment, the
Court held that Title VII is not limited to economic or tangible
discrimination and that it encompasses a broad range of disparate treatment
of men and women in employment. 41 The Court analogized this situation
to racial harassment and found it to be just as degrading to require a man or
woman to endure sexual abuse in return for the privilege of being allowed
to make a living. 42
Determining whether a work environment is hostile depends on the
totality of the circumstances, which may include: the severity of the
discriminatory conduct; its frequency; its scope-that is, whether it is
physically threatening or humiliating, or a passing offensive utterance; and
if it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance.43 In
37. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66-67 (1986) (recognizing
Rogers v. EEOC as the first case to acknowledge the creation of a discriminatory work
environment as a cause of action).
38. Id.at 67 (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)).
39. See id at 61.
40. Id.
41. See id.at 64-67 (noting that the statutory language of Title VII and the EEOC
guidelines support the contention that Congress intended Title VII to be interpreted
broadly).
42. See id at 67 (citing Henson, 682 F.2d at 902) (arguing that sexual harassment
and racial discrimination are equally arbitrary societal barriers).
43. See Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enterprises, Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 872 (9th Cir. 2001)
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Gorski v. New Hampshire Department of Corrections, the First Circuit
found that a female prison guard stated a valid claim of hostile work
environment by presenting evidence of seven separate examples of what
she asserted were hostile or derogatory comments about her pregnancy. 44
Finally, the plaintiff should prove that the work environment is both
objectively and subjectively hostile, and that this hostility is based on sex. 45
"The objective severity of harassment should be judged from the
perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiffs position., 46 If the
objective standard is met by the plaintiff, the court must determine if the
workplace is a subjectively hostile environment. If the victim "does not
subjectively perceive the environment to be abusive, the conduct has not
actually altered the conditions
of the victim's employment, and there is no
47
Title VII violation.,
B. The Case of Kirleis v. Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote
Both the stereotyping and hostile work environment theories discussed
above are plausible strategies that could be successful for attorney Alyson
Kirleis, who filed suit against her employer, the law firm of DMC, on
November 9, 2006.48 Kirleis's claims allege discrimination and retaliation
against her by male attorneys at the firm because of her sex and that male
attorneys subjected her to a hostile work environment. 49 Kirleis began her
employment as an associate at the Philadelphia firm in 1988.50 Effective in
1998, she was made a Class B shareholder and in 2001 she became a Class

(citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)) (explaining that isolated
incidents, unless they are extremely serious, will not create an objectively hostile
working environment).
44. See 290 F.3d 466, 474 (lst Cir. 2002).
45. See, e.g., Nichols, 256 F.3d at 872-74 (holdin that the victim had an actionable
claim because a sustained campaign of taunts is objectively hostile and because the
victim demonstrated that he subjectively perceived the work environment as hostile
when he complained about the taunting, and the taunting was due to sex-specifically
the perception that the victim was effeminate).
46. See id. at 872-73 (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S.
75, 81-82 (1998)) (determining that a reasonable man would have found the
unrelenting verbal abuse endured by plaintiff at the hands of his coworkers about his
feminine characteristics to be sufficiently severe and pervasive to alter the terms and
conditions of employment).
47. See id. at 873 (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22) (concluding that complaints
by the victim about the degrading verbal abuse showed that the conduct of his
coworkers was unwelcome and that he perceived his workplace to be hostile).
48. See, e.g., Filisko, supranote 5.
49. See Complaint
19, 43, Kirleis v. Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, P.C., No.
06-1495 (W.D. Pa. Nov, 9, 2006) (alleging defendant has a pattern of discriminating
against women by paying them lower wages and assigning them lower quality work).
50. See Kirleis v. Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, PC, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
53542, at *15-16 (W.D. Pa. July 24, 2007).
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A shareholder.5 Following the filing of this suit, DMC filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, claiming that
Kirleis was not an "employee" covered by Title VII because of her
shareholder status. The United States District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania disagreed and found that Kirleis presented
evidence that the firm had sixty-three shareholders but that control was
concentrated only in the small number of members serving on the
Executive Committee, which did not include her, and so she was an
employee for purposes of Title VII protection.52
Kirleis's complaint lays out numerous incidents on which she bases her
claims. To begin, Kirleis makes two general allegations against DMC: (1)
the firm's method of establishing her annual compensation was not applied
to similarly-situated male attorneys who were performing the same or less
work than she performed; and (2) the firm had a lower, separate
employment track for women who had taken maternity leave and/or had
children.5 3 One interesting part of this case is that the remarks directed at
Kirleis were somewhat the reverse of what many women with children
endure at work. Many women, once they have children, are treated as
though they are not as dedicated to, or are incompetent in, their jobs
because of responsibilities at home.54 In this case, however, one of
Kirleis's supervisors, who determined her annual compensation,
approached her and opined that her priorities were not straight because she
did not spend enough time with her husband and children at home.5 5 He
then further commented that "women whose priorities were straight were
those who relinquished their status as shareholders in the firm and who
worked part-time so as to be able to spend more time with their husbands
and children. 56 Although these statements appear to be the reverse of
51. See id at *7-16 (findin& that although Kirleis was a shareholder she was also
an employee because the executive committee that managed the defendant-firm had the
power to supervise and force out shareholders, and because Kirleis had minimal
influence or control over the way the firm was run).
52. See id at *16, *21 (denying DMC's motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction and defendant's motion to compel arbitration because Kirleis was an
employee for purposes of Title VII protection and under Pennsylvania law, she had not
actually agreed to arbitrate her claims); see also Kirleis v. Dickie, McCamey &
Chilcote, P.C., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75996, at *10 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 12, 2007)
(denying DMC's motion to stay proceedings pending an appeal of the district court's
decision to deny defendant's motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, to compel
arbitration).
13-14.
53. Complaint, supra note 49,
54. See, e.g., Trezza v. Hartford, Inc., 1998 WL 912101, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30,
1998) (describing comments by defendants "about the incompetence and laziness of
women who are also working mothers" as evidence of discrimination based on family
responsibility stereotypes).
55. Complaint, supra note 49, 15.
56. Id. 16.
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those that normally give rise to cases under Title VII FRD claims, they still
follow the same pattern: that work is incompatible with motherhood.
Kirleis's additional discrimination claims allege that another annual
compensation decision-maker told her that one of the firm's largest
clients-the one for whom Kirleis performed the majority of her workwanted only "gray haired guys" working on its cases.57 He also stated that
the "gals" in the office would perform all of the initial work to prepare the
cases for the male attorneys to then try in court. 58
Kirleis also claims that DMC was a workplace environment that was
pervasively hostile towards women as a result of conduct by the male
attorneys, alleging that the male attorneys took actions to humiliate the
females and to exclude them from opportunities to develop important
personal and professional relationships with clients and colleagues. 9
Kirleis lists numerous instances of excluding women from the annual
parties and social outings sponsored by the firm because of the sexually
explicit nature of the events and conduct by the male attorneys who
attended them. 6 ° One male attorney even exposed himself to Kirleis in
front of two other male attorneys at an annual golf outing in the early
1990s. 61 The following analysis will examine Kirleis's case using two
theories--discrimination based on sex stereotypes, including stereotypes
about working mothers, and hostile work environment-under Title VII to
determine how the district court should hold on these two claims.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Kirleis Should Have a Successful Claim of Sex DiscriminationAgainst
DMC Under a Title VII Stereotyping Theory Because the Firm Took
Adverse Employment Actions Against Her Due to Her Sex and Family
Responsibilities
As alluded to previously, the case Kirleis filed against her firm likely
will become significant in the area of family responsibility discrimination
for several reasons. First, her case is incredibly unique. Kirleis was a
successful attorney at the firm and conformed to the work schedule of an
ideal worker, meaning she worked long hours for high-profile clients and
took little time off for non-work responsibilities.62 Second, in spite of her
57. Id. 17.
58. Id. 18.
59. Id. 37.

60. See id. % 38-40 (alleging that Kirleis and her female co-workers were
effectively excluded from DMC's Christmas parties and annual golf outings).
61. Id. 41.
62. See WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 5 (stating that the schedule of an ideal worker
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following what are known as "male norms" in employment, a male
attorney approached her and questioned her priorities.63 Third, Kirleis's
situation is an interesting example of the "double bind" that affects all
women in the workforce, as it is distinct from more the typical cases in
which working mothers are discriminated against for choosing to work
part-time in order to spend more time at home. 64 With all of the issues this
case involves, it touches the many aspects of feminist theory mentioned
above that this article will discuss in more detail in Part IV.
In this very important case, a jury should determine that DMC
discriminated against Kirleis on the basis of untested prescriptive
stereotypes about how females, specifically female attorneys with children,
should balance work and family responsibilities. The Supreme Court in
Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs made clear that notions
regarding mothers being insufficiently devoted to work and notions that
work and motherhood are incompatible are themselves gender-based
stereotypes that discriminate against women in the workplace in violation
of Title VII. 65 Just as Ann Hopkins's supervisors-who made decisions
about her promotions-made comments to her and others that she did not
act femininely enough and did not conform to the stereotypical behavior
with which they were comfortable, Kirleis did not conform to the
stereotypes her supervisors had in mind of working attorney-mothers. 66 It
appears as though the male attorneys that made decisions about Kirleis's
annual compensation felt that she should display the more feminine, or
"motherly" traits of spending more time on caretaking responsibilities at

in an elite job often requires fifty to seventy hours of work per week).
63. See CHAMALLAS, supra note 12, at 7 (identifying the definitions of full-time
and part-time work as an example of "male norms" or "male bias" in employment
because most part-time workers are women and the standard of forty hours per week
reflects the average amount of time that men work).
64. See id. at 9 (explaining that Ann Hopkins, the plaintiff in Price Waterhouse,
was an example of an employee caught in a "double bind" because she was denied
partnership for being too aggressive, however, employment practices at the firm
showed that she likely also would not have made partner if she exhibited the more
feminine traits mentioned by her colleagues).
65. See 538 U.S. 721, 732-34 (2003) (holding that evidence of gender stereotypes
in state parental leave laws, namely that women's family duties trump those of the
workplace, justified Congress's passage of the Family and Medical Leave Act).
66. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235, 251 (1989) (plurality
opinion) (describing Hopkins's supervisors' remarks about her acting too "macho" and
suggesting that she take a "course at charm school" as evidence that their employment
decision not to promote her was gender-based stereotyping); see also Plaetzer v. Borton
Auto., Inc., 2004 WL 2066770, at *1, *7 (D. Minn. Aug. 13, 2004) (denying summary
judgment because of a finding of sufficient evidence to suggest that the employee's
termination was motivated by discriminatory animus shown by employer's statements
preceding the action that plaintiff should "do the right thing" and stay home with her
children, despite plaintiff's ability to satisfactorily perform her job).
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home instead of on work as a shareholder in the office.6 7 They even went
as far as to say she did not have her priorities straight because she was too
devoted to her career, and that mothers with appropriate priorities would
step down and work a part-time schedule.68 This treatment is very similar
to that which Hopkins endured as an aggressive career woman who went
after her goals at work and refused to take a second seat to the men at the
office, which led to her colleagues characterizing her as "consistently
annoying and irritating., 69 Kirleis, just like Hopkins, had been more
aggressive with her working hours and more determined to grow in her
career, as is evidenced by her position as shareholder in the firm. Just as
the Court found the comments of Hopkins's supervisors about her lack of
feminine qualities to be sex-based discrimination on stereotypical notions
of how a female should act in the workplace, so should a jury in this case
find the comments by Kirleis's supervisors about a mother's role as an
attorney in their firm to be sex-based discrimination
on the basis of gender70
VII.
Title
of
violation
in
stereotypes
role
Moreover, just like the plaintiff in Sheehan v. Donlen Corp., Kirleis put
forth various incidents where her supervisors directly made sexist
statements to her based on their stereotypical views of the roles of working
mothers.71 Just as a reasonable jury could find that the remarks by
Sheehan's manager about the role of mothers in the workplace were
evidence of discriminatory intent in firing her, so could a reasonable jury
find that the comments by the men who decide on annual compensation
and workload assignments to Kirleis about her misaligned priorities are
evidence of discriminatory intent. This is particularly the case here where
their comments were made contemporaneously with their decision to
reduce the work she did for one of their biggest clients because the client
wanted only "gray haired guys" trying its cases.72 The situation in Kirleis's
case, where one of the men was an annual compensation decision-maker
and remarked that women with children whose priorities were straight
relinquished their status as shareholders and worked part time to spend

67. See Complaint, supra note 49,

15-16.

68. See id.

69. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235 (noting that partners who had almost no
contact with the plaintiff described her as "universally disliked" and aggravating).
70. See id. at 256 (reasoning that if an employee's flawed interpersonal skills could
in fact be corrected with makeup application or a pink suit, then it likely was the
employee's sex, and not her interpersonal skills or work ethic, that was the real
problem).
71. See 173 F.3d 1039, 1044-45 (7th Cir. 1999) (recognizing that a reasonable jury
could believe that Sheehan's manager's remarks to her about inviting her to stay home
if she had another baby were intentionally discriminatory and a basis for his
employment decision to terminate her).
72. See id at 1044.
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more time with their children, is extremely close to the situation in
Sheehan's case where a supervisor made statements to a pregnant woman
that she was being fired so she could "spend more time at home with her
children. 73 Just as the court found in Sheehan that the statements were
discriminatory, so too should a jury find the remarks to Kirleis to be
motivated by unlawful stereotypes about a woman's place at a firm after
having children.74
Even if Kirleis's colleagues had her best interests at heart, benevolent
stereotyping is also illegal under Title VII. An employer or supervisor
cannot make suggestions that a mother should work a lighter schedule to
have more time to spend at home, or pass her up for a promotion assuming
she would not want to relocate her family, even if he believes that this will
improve her home life, or even her work product, by lessening her stress of
balancing priorities. 75 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's
("EEOC") guidance on family responsibility discrimination gives an
example of unlawful benevolent stereotyping that is incredibly similar to
Kirleis's case. In its example, the EEOC describes the story of Rhonda,
who told her boss that she had become the guardian of her niece and
nephew who were coming to live with her.76 Rhonda's boss stated he was
worried that Rhonda would be unable to balance her new family
responsibilities with her demanding job.7 7 Soon after making these
remarks, he removed Rhonda from the lead position on three of the firm's
biggest accounts and assigned her to more behind-the-scenes supporting
roles on smaller accounts.78 This sounds exactly like what DMC did to
Kirleis after making remarks that she should relinquish shareholder duties
and work part-time. 79 At the end of its description, the EEOC explains that
the employer engaged in unlawful sex discrimination against Rhonda by
taking an adverse employment action against a female employee based on
stereotypical assumptions that she could not balance her work and
73. See id. at 1045; Complaint, supra note 49, 16.
74. See Sheehan, 173 F.3d at 1044 (quoting Randle v. LaSalle Telecomm., Inc.,
876 F.2d 563, 569 (7th Cir. 1999)) (determining that "'remarks and other evidence that
reflect a propensity by the decision-maker to evaluate employees based on illegal
criteria will suffice as direct evidence of discrimination,' even short of an admission of
illegal motivation" by the employer); Complaint, supra note 49, 15-16.
75. See, e.g., Lust v. Sealy, Inc., 383 F.3d 580, 583 (7th Cir. 2004) (reiterating the
fact that Lust's supervisor admitted that he did not consider her for a promotion at
another office because she had children and he assumed she would not want to relocate
her family).
76. See EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 18, ex. 7.

77. See id.(recounting that Rhonda's boss also felt she would suffer from stress
and exhaustion due to the new family responsibilities).
78. See id. (explaining that Rhonda was told she was being transferred so she could

spend more time with her new family).
79. See Complaint, supra note 49,

16.
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caregiving responsibilities at home. 80 DMC's actions, with regard to
Kirleis, perfectly parallel Rhonda's case, and under the EEOC guidance, its
actions also should be considered unlawful. 8 1
Furthermore, after the Second Circuit's decision in Back v. Hastings-onHudson Union Free School District, it appears as though courts are moving
away from requiring a plaintiff to show comparative evidence when
bringing a sex discrimination or FRD suit under Title VII. 82 Previously, in
Brown v. Henderson, cited by the Back court, the court announced the
principle that the ultimate issues in discrimination cases are the reasons
behind the individual plaintiffs treatment, and "not the relative treatment
of different groups" of persons "within the workplace. 8 3 Although Back is
only binding in the Second Circuit, it is helpful to note that the EEOC cited
this holding favorably in its guidance for employers on how to avoid a
lawsuit based on family responsibility discrimination. 84 The EEOC advises
that comparative evidence is helpful in a sex-based treatment case, but not
necessary.
It appears that under this theory, Kirleis can definitely show
evidence that she, as an individual at the firm, was treated differently than
others because she was a female shareholder with children. One decisionmaker directly told Kirleis that a main client, for whom she performed the
majority of her work, wanted older men and not women to try their cases in
court.86 The Back decision instructs that this evidence may be enough to
prove that gender played a part in subsequent employment decisions and
that Kirleis need not bring in evidence of how other men with children, or
87
men or women without children, were treated within the workplace.
In conclusion, Kirleis should have success in her claims of
discrimination based on sex and family responsibility under a Title VII sex
stereotyping theory in light of the foregoing discussion. Male attorneys
who were in a position to make decisions about Kirleis's annual
compensation and work assignments made statements directly to her
evidencing prescriptive stereotyping about the role of a female attorney
with children at DMC.88 Specifically, the male attorneys suggested that she
relinquish her shareholder status and duties in order to spend more time at
80. See EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 18, ex. 7.

81. See Complaint, supra note 49, 18.
82. 365 F.3d 107, 122 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that stereotypical remarks about the
incompatibility of Back's motherhood and employment could be evidence that gender
played a role in employment decisions).
83. See id. at 121 (citing Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2001)).
84. See EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 18, at II.A.1.
85. See id.

86. See Complaint, supra note 49,
87. See Back, 365 F.3d at 122.
88. See Complaint, supra note 49,

17-18.
15-16.
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home with her husband and children, as this is how they believed women
with proper priorities should act. Subsequent to these statements, DMC
reduced Kirleis's work responsibilities for one of its largest clients and told
her only men would try that client's cases in court. There may be further
evidence to support Kirleis's allegations of discrimination in that DMC had
an inferior employment track and lower compensation scale for female
attorneys with children than male attorneys doing equal or less work. Just
as in previous cases, it appears that there is ample reason for a jury to
determine that DMC made employment decisions based on gender and
stereotypical assumptions by its decision makers of mothers' roles in the
workforce. 9
B. Kirleis Should Have Success in Her Claim of a Hostile Work
Environment Under Title VII Against DMC Because of the Pervasive
HarassmentShe Endured as a Result of Her Sex
In addition to her claims under the sex-stereotyping theory previously
discussed, a jury should also find that Kirleis has a successful claim for
violation of Title VII by DMC under a hostile work environment theory;
however, it likely will be a much more difficult case than the one under a
theory of sex stereotyping. For a successful hostile work environment
claim, Kirleis must show that the harassment she endured at DMC was
"sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's]
employment and create an abusive working environment." 90 It appears as
though the harassment Kirleis experienced in being excluded from forming
professional and personal relationships with clients and colleaguesincluding members of the executive committee-because the men at the
firm wanted to engage in sexually explicit conduct, did alter her work
conditions. 91 It was likely embarrassing and degrading to attend these firmsponsored events with the male attorneys, and by not attending, Kirleis
missed the opportunity to forge relationships that were important to her
89. See Lust v. Sealy, Inc., 383 F.3d 580, 583 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding that a
manager's admission that he did not consider plaintiff for a promotion because she had
children to be evidence of impermissible sex-based caregiver discrimination); Back,
365 F.3d at 122 (concluding that evidence of stereotyping women as caregivers alone
can be evidence of unlawful sex-based motives behind employment decisions); Trezza
v. Hartford, Inc., 1998 WL 912101, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 1998) (determining that
employer's failure to promote plaintiff may have resulted from his assumptions that she
would not want to travel away from her family during the week); Sivieri v.
Commonwealth, 2003 Mass. Super. LEXIS 201, at *7-8 (Mass. Sup. Ct. June 26, 2003)
(deciding that parental status could be a characteristic closely linked to gender and that
the allegations by plaintiff established a bias against women with young children
"predicated on the stereotypical belief' that women are incapable of doing a competent
job at work while at the same time caring for young children at home).
90. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (quoting Henson v.
City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)).
91. See Complaint, supranote 49, 37-41.
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success at the firm. Kirleis was even constructively excluded from the
firm's annual golf outing after a male attorney exposed himself to her at
this event. 92 As mentioned previously, the Supreme Court has held that the
standard for a hostile work environment is not limited to economic or
tangible discrimination and that it encompasses a broad range of disparate
treatment of men and women in employment. 93 Under this standard, it
seems that the constructive exclusion of Kirleis from firm-sponsored
functions could rise to the level of creating a hostile work environment in
violation of Title VII. An analysis of the facts under a totality of the
circumstances standard should then proceed in three parts, determining an
objective view of the hostile nature of the environment, Kirleis's subjective
view of the hostility of94the work environment, and whether the harassment
was because of her sex.
To begin, a jury should conclude that a reasonable person in Kirleis's
position would find the workplace environment at DMC objectively hostile
toward female employees. The first factor a jury could consider would be
the frequency of the discriminatory conduct.95 Kirleis's complaint states
that DMC constructively excluded her, along with other female attorneys,
from the annual Christmas party because of the sexually explicit nature of
the entertainment. 96 The complaint does not say how many times this has
occurred, but one could assume that it has occurred for a number of years
leading up to the filing of this lawsuit. Kirleis and other female attorneys
also have been constructively excluded from the annual DMC golf outing
due to the sexually suggestive nature of the conduct and behavior of the
male attorneys that attend the event. 97 Although it may appear that the
actions of excluding Kirleis and the other female attorneys are not directly
sexual in nature, and thus do not create a hostile work environment, this is
not the case. Courts have recognized that "incidents of nonsexual
conduct-such as work sabotage, exclusion, denial of support, 98and
humiliation--can in context contribute to a hostile work environment."
The objective view of hostility in the work environment at DMC must

92. See id. 41.
93. See Meritor,477 U.S. at 64.

94. See Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enterprises, Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 871-72 (9th Cir.
2001).
95. See id at 872 (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)).
96. See Complaint, supra note 49, 38-39.
97. See id. 40-41.

98. See Gorski v. New Hampshire Dep't of Corr., 290 F.3d 466, 472 (1st Cir. 2002)
(quoting O'Rourke v. City of Providence, 235 F.3d 723, 730 (1st Cir. 2001))
(discussing how hostile work environment claims based on sex derived from identical
theories based on race, religion, and national origin; thus, the harassment need not be
sexual in nature to prove a hostile work environment).
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take into account all of the circumstances surrounding Kirleis's
employment as a female attorney there and the constructive exclusion from
the firm-sponsored Christmas parties and golf outings. 99 The female
attorneys at DMC should have had the same opportunities to forge
relationships with clients and colleagues as the men without being
subjected to a "gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege." 100
When factoring in the comments about Kirleis relinquishing her duties as a
shareholder to stay at home with her family and the fact that a male
attorney exposed himself to her at the golf outing one year, a reasonable
person in Kirleis's position would not feel as though she could comfortably
attend the firm-sponsored events, and would feel as though she were
0
employed in a hostile work environment on account of the exclusion.' 1
This is especially true because a reasonable person in this situation might
view the male attorneys' conduct-attending private strip shows at the
conclusion of the Christmas party and using sexually explicit entertainment
by way of props and skits-to be anti-female. It is likely that some stories
from these events may find their way into the workplace where female
employees can hear them, and although Kirleis' complaint does not allege
such facts, courts recognize that
such "anti-female" conduct can contribute
02
to a hostile work environment.
Pervasiveness is another factor in determining whether a work
environment is objectively hostile. 03 The harassment in Kirleis's case is
not as pervasive as the sexual intercourse and forced rape that took place in
Meritor Savings Bank, however, there was an example of extreme
inappropriateness when a male attorney exposed himself to Kirleis in front
of two other male attorneys at the firm-sponsored golf outing. The social
impact of this incident on Kirleis's professional relationship with all three
male attorneys present was likely great, considering the embarrassment and
intimidation a female would experience in such a situation. In any case, the
totality of the circumstances involved in the actions towards Kirleis appears
at least as pervasive as the seven incidents of coworkers making remarks
99. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998)

(recognizing that the "real social impact of workplace behavior often depends on a
constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations and relationships which are
not fully captured by a simple recitation of the words used or the physical acts
performed").
100. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (quoting Henson v.
Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11 th Cir. 1982)).
101. See id.; Gorski, 290 F.3d at 472.
102. See Gorski, 290 F.3d at 472 (citing Lipsett v. Univ. of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d
881, 905 (1st Cir. 1988)) (stating that "sexually-charged or salacious behavior is often
sufficient," but not necessary, evidence to prove that a work environment is hostile to
women).
103. See Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enterprises, Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 872 (9th Cir.
2001).
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about pregnant women to plaintiff in Gorski." With the seriousness of the
events that took place at the golf outing, and the continued constructive
exclusion of Kirleis from firm-sponsored events based on her sex, it
appears that these incidents were more than a single episode and were
sufficiently continuous and concerted to be deemed pervasive by the
district court.1 0 5 Given the totality of the circumstances in Kirleis's
situation, a reasonable person in her position would find the work
environment objectively hostile.
In addition to finding Kirleis's work environment objectively hostile, a
jury should determine whether Kirleis herself subjectively believed the
work environment at DMC to be hostile toward her based on her sex or her
family responsibilities. This finding may be tough for a jury to make
because Kirleis continued to work at DMC and because her complaint does
not allege that she ever attempted to file .a complaint with the firm
internally. Courts, however, have recognized that just because all of a
victim's interactions with the harassers were not hostile does not mean that
none of them were intimidating. 0 6 A plaintiff can still establish a hostile
work environment through harassment even though the plaintiff also has
otherwise ordinary interactions with her harassers. 10 7 Thus, a jury should
find that Kirleis's decision to continue employment at DMC, even after
filing her lawsuit, is insufficient to prove that she did not believe she was
enduring a hostile environment. A jury should accept Kirleis's actions of
filing charges of sex discrimination against DMC with the EEOC, and then
with the district court, as evidence that Kirleis subjectively believed she
endured a hostile work environment on the basis of her sex and family
responsibilities at DMC. 10 8 Furthermore, a jury could even find evidence
that Kirleis subjectively found herself to be in a hostile work environment
104. See Gorski, 290 F.3d at 474 (finding that seven examples of derogatory
statements to plaintiff while she was pregnant were enough to find error in dismissing
plaintiff's hostile work environment claim).
105. See, e.g., Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1980) (announcing one of
the first hostile environment decisions finding that the conduct of an employer created

a hostile environment for Hispanic employees by providing discriminatory service to
its Hispanic clientele). But see Trezza v. Hartford, Inc., 1998 WL 912101, at *4

(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 1998) (discussing standards announced by various cases in finding
that plaintiffs claims were insufficient for a hostile work environment because
defendants' comments were isolated and discrete).
106. See Nichols, 256 F.3d at 873.
107. See id. (finding that plaintiff sensibly excluded minor horseplay viewed as

"male bonding" from his hostile environment claim).
108. See Sivieri v. Commonwealth, 2003 Mass. Super. LEXIS 201, at *12 (Mass.
Sup. Ct. June 26, 2003) (deciding that plaintiffs allegations of a hostile work
environment were based on the same facts as her sex discrimination claim, that she
endured unequal work terms and on-going comments about employees with small
children, and therefore should not be dismissed); see also Complaint, supra note 49,
1,10-11.
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as evidenced by the noticeable absence of female employees, including
Kirleis herself, at firm-sponsored events.
Finally, from the comments and conduct of the male attorneys at
DMC, a jury should also find that this hostility was based on Kirleis's sex
and family responsibility and not her job performance. Kirleis attained the
position of Class A shareholder at the firm and none of the comments
directed to her mentioned anything about poor work product. A finding for
Kirleis by a jury on her claims of hostile work environment will show
employers that they should pay close attention to the actions of their
employees toward one another and put into place accessible grievance
procedures to deal with such matters internally.
C. Future Implicationsfor Family Responsibility and Sex Discrimination
Cases After Kirleis v. Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote
The outcome of Kirleis v. Dickie, McCamey & Chicote under the two
theories explored above will likely have far-reaching implications for both
employers and employees involved in future Title VII cases because this
case has such unique characteristics. First, this case was brought by a
successful, highly paid attorney at a major law firm in Pittsburgh. Kirleis
did a large amount of her work in the areas of labor and employment law
and the firm had an established employment law practice. 10 9 Moreover,
DMC was recognized shortly before Kirleis filed her lawsuit-in October
2006-as one of the "50 Best Places to Work in Western Pennsylvania" by
the PittsburghBusiness Times.' 10 All of these factors point to a conclusion
that the outcome of this case likely will have an effect on future FRD
lawsuits brought by other women in demanding careers. Before this case,
many women in the same position as Kirleis-working mothers in
powerful and challenging careers-would likely have brushed off such
comments about skewed priorities by male colleagues. After this case,
many female attorneys who endure hostility at work because they have
made alternate child-care arrangements in order to devote a large amount of
time to their careers will be encouraged to challenge the stereotype which
exists in law firms: that success at work ends where family life begins.
Kirleis's case has received much publicity because of its unique
characteristics and because it will likely encourage many women who are
executives, doctors, or successful persons in various other demanding
professions to similarly challenge the myth that competent work and
motherhood are incompatible. In addition, this case will likely raise even
more awareness among plaintiffs' attorneys that if managing attorneys at a

109. See Cato, supra note 5.
110. See id
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revered employment law firm treat a successful female lawyer in such a
discriminatory way because of stereotypes they hold about female workers
with children, then it is probably happening under the radar to multitudes of
other lower-profile women in all areas of the workforce.
One other dramatic implication this case may have on potential FRD
cases is to encourage working women to take a stand against
discrimination. It is likely that many women who truly enjoy their jobs
endure the same type of comments as Kirleis did, but let them slide because
they do not want to have to leave. Many more women may not be able to
leave their jobs for financial reasons and so they continue to endure
discrimination and hostility in their working environments. This case
makes the example that a woman can continue to stay with an employer
and do the work that she enjoys, all while standing up for her rights in the
face of employment discrimination under Title VII. Kirleis is still working
in her shareholder capacity at DMC despite the pending litigation on her
behalf."1 Her lawyer explains that she only filed the suit to make sure that
how she is treated at work, and how other females are treated at DMC,
changes for the better. 1 2 This may be a lesson to many women that they
should not be threatened by the possible loss of a job they need or want to
keep. No woman deserves the task of choosing between employment and
financial security on the one hand or a life free from discrimination at work
on the other. More importantly, no woman deserves the daunting chore of
choosing between exercising her fundamental right to have children, or
following her desire to have a successful career.
The outcome of this case will also have implications on employers,
especially law firms. Law firms will take notice of this case as an example
of what can go wrong even when they have the best intentions. DMC was
selected as one of the greatest places to work and had an employment
practice that advised influential companies on sexual harassment policies
and corporate standards on treatment in the workplace. This aspect may be
quite troubling to other similarly situated firms that may be vulnerable to
employee lawsuits for sex or family responsibility discrimination. Joan
Williams, employment law professor and Center for WorkLife Law
director at the University of California Hastings College of Law, stated in
an interview that "in at least one of the thirty-two cases [against legal
employers], the judge made it very clear he was holding the law firm to a
higher standard because it had an employment [law] section and should

11. See Filisko, supra note 5 (noting that it is highly unusual for an employee to
stay on working for the same employer after filing a suit while litigation is pending).
112. See id. (quoting Kirleis's attorney stating it was an incredibly difficult decision
for Kirleis to file the lawsuit against her employer and providing the reasons why she
eventually did so).
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have known better."' 13 With this in mind, it is my conclusion that the
Kirleis case will cause law firms in all areas of practice to reevaluate their
policies in the workplace, especially those involving sexual harassment,
and to retrain employees at all levels as to what is appropriate behavior
towards coworkers in the workplace. While reevaluating workplace
policies, law firms should make sure that there are internal complaint
procedures in place that both encourage employees to come forward with
discrimination and harassment complaints and to protect employees once
they do decide to come forward.
IV. THEORETICAL DISCUSSION: FEMINIST THEORY AND THE
SIGNIFICANCE OF KIRLEIS V. DICKIE, MCCAMEY & CHILCOTE UNDER A

FEMINIST ANALYSIS

As mentioned briefly above, Kirleis's case touches on many aspects of

feminist theory and literature. First, because she was a woman, Kirleis
faced the possibility of hitting a maternal wall in her career that would keep
her from advancing further.' 14 To avoid this, Kirleis continued to work a
demanding schedule even after giving birth to two sons. She did not elect
to work part-time to spend more time at home, but instead found alternative
ways for her family to be cared for while she continued to put in long hours
at the office. This section concentrates on the significance of the filing of
this case in light of the struggles women face in employment because of the
presence of employers' biases regarding ideal workers and the maternal
wall. Additionally, this section will analyze the facts of Kirleis's case from
a feminist perspective, using the five opening "moves" utilized by feminist
scholars for decades. Finally, this section will propose a strategy and
solutions for cases similar to Kirleis, brought by other women
discriminated against in employment because of real or perceived family
responsibilities.
A. The Maternal Wall and Ideal Worker: Kirleis Broke with "Tradition"
but Still Encounteredthe Double Bind in Employment
Kirleis was a unique employee, not because she was a successful
shareholder in a major law firm or because she worked while raising two
young children, but because she did both concurrently. It is not detailed in
her complaint, but Kirleis likely was able to do this by having help at home
from her husband, other family members, or a nanny. This situation had
113. See id. (quoting Joan Williams discussing the possible impact that the Kirleis
case will have on law firms around the country).
114. See Williams & Bomstein, supra note 3, at 177 (discussing one type of

maternal wall stereotyping as role incongruity, the assumption by employers that
women cannot be both good mothers and good employees).
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not occurred often and did not fit into the mold the male attorneys at
Kirleis's firm had grown to expect. Many women, especially in the
demanding field of legal practice, are stopped from advancing to
shareholder status by the maternal wall." 15 The maternal wall results when
employees are offered schedules that few mothers are willing
to work, e.g.,
6
the typical attorney work week of fifty or sixty hours. 1
Even when female workers in demanding positions like Kirleis's appear
to have surpassed the potential obstacle of the maternal wall, they may still
encounter a double bind in the workplace. Many attorneys, especially
women, find themselves caught in a clash between society's ideals for
work and ideals for family life. The ideals of family-that children need
and deserve time with their parents at home-are fundamentally
inconsistent with work ideals that value the employee who works long
hours and overtime, taking no time off for family responsibilities." 7
Kirleis's case is a classic example of the double bind. The male attorney
who approached her said that female shareholder attorneys whose priorities
were straight would step down from such a demanding position to spend
more time at home with their families. Kirleis faced the same predicament
as Ann Hopkins in Price Waterhouse." 8 If Kirleis had opted for a parttime schedule, she likely would not have attained shareholder status and
would have received less important assignments; yet, when she decided to
stay on a full-time schedule and continue working long hours, her
commitment as a mother was questioned and it was suggested that she
needed to stop working such long hours for high-profile clients and instead
concentrate on her family responsibilities.
The double bind found in the Kirleis case is important to note because it
shows how pervasive difficult choices really are for women in demanding
jobs. The double bind often works to take away the freedom of choice for
many women. If a woman decides to have children and reduce her work to
part-time, her supervisors may begin to consider her less committed to her
work. If a woman chooses to have children but remains full-time, as
115. See Joan C. Williams, Lecture, Canaries in the Mine: Work/Family Conflict
and the Law, 70 FORDHAM L. REv. 2221, 2222 (2002) (providing evidence that

although women have comprised half of law school student populations for years,
eighty-six percent of law firm partners remain men).
116. See id. at 2223 (noting that ninety-three percent of mothers aged twenty-five to
forty-four worked fewer than fifty hours a week year round, making them non-ideal
workers).
117. See id. at 2238 (describing the situation leading up to the maternal wall and the
decision that most women must eventually face, either choose a successful career or a
successful family life).
118. See WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 70 (explaining the catch twenty-two in which
Ann Hopkins found herself, where aggressiveness was part of the job description, but
in acting so as a female, she was unqualified for partnership when compared with her
male counterparts).
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Kirleis did, her supervisors may view her as an inadequate mother. Thus,
to avoid both of these negative outcomes, many women are forced to make
an unpleasant choice: have a career or have a family. When caught in the
double bind, the choice by many women to leave the workforce and return
to the home must be understood as oftentimes coerced. To avoid this
difficult decision, employers must stop stigmatizing part-time workers, or
workers who decide to have children but remain at work full-time.
Employers should try to work with their employees to come to
individualized "balanced hours" schedules to achieve the best resulting
work product for the employer and family life for the employee. 9
The suggestion that employers work with employees on an
individualized basis to work out balanced schedules is meant to take place
in the initial stages of an employee's career. The need for balanced hours
for each employee will obviously change over the course of one's career
and must be revisited as needed. The human resources department could
complete this process easily with an annual survey for the employee at the
time of his or her annual evaluation. This should not be a part of the
employee's actual evaluation, but planning completion of the survey at the
same time will enable the human resources department to find out how the
employee feels about his or her schedule and what is working for each
particular employee. Putting the administrative time into this process is
worth the effort to avoid a potential lawsuit by an employee who claims
FRD at some later point in his or her career. An employer also should
provide on-the-job training for all employees about FRD, just as employers
do for sexual harassment prevention, and about balanced schedules. 120 This
training should identify common biases in employment, such as the idea
that women with children spend less time at work but men with children
should work the same number of hours as they did before becoming a
father. The employer should take every effort to make sure that each
employee is evaluated according to his or her merit and job performance
only, and not in any way according to a certain schedule requested because
of family responsibilities at home.
Aside from the responsibilities of employers to avoid cornering
employees in a double bind, employees must also be proactive participants
for such a program to work. Each employee must be clear about his or her
119. See Williams, supra note 115, at 2231 (concluding that both male and female
employees alike want "balanced hours," not part-time hours, and that employers must
realize there is no "one size fits all solution").
120. See id. at 2236 (suggesting that how-to training should include: "the pros and
cons of different types of balanced schedules; how to ensure that business needs are
met; how to ensure communication among lawyers and responsiveness to clients when
attorneys are not in the office; time management and realistic deadline-setting; and
criteria for evaluating individual success").
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expectations regarding hours on the job, yet also be aware of the
employer's goals and what the employer expects in certain positions. Once
an employee reaches an agreement on a balanced hours schedule, the
employee should continue to provide the employer with his or her best
work during the time he or she spends on assigned projects. Reaching
common goals with balanced hour schedules will benefit the employee by
avoiding a double bind and enabling him or her to achieve success in more
than one area of life. This will also benefit the employer by cutting down
on retraining costs due to high attrition rates of employees with children
21
and by improving work product by employees with more balanced lives.1
B. Feminist Theory Analysis and Strategy ProposalRegardingKirleis and
Other Similar Cases
As this article suggests, Kirleis's case is significant for the area of
feminist theory. To begin a discussion of feminist legal theory, it is helpful
to envision Kirleis's situation, and potential future cases, through a feminist
lens. 22 For decades throughout the feminist movement, scholars often
employed a few recurring "moves" that help to place women at the center
of societal issues. 123 This section analyzes these moves and proposes a
feminist strategy for best approaching cases involving FRD.
Although FRD is a problem that affects both men and women, the first
move of the feminist perspective is to understand women's experiences. In
the area of employment discrimination based on family responsibilities,
this is not hard to do. The maternal wall makes it difficult for mothers to
perform as ideal workers because they must take time away from work for
pregnancy, maternity leave, and other continuing demands related to childrearing. 124 As law professor Nicole Buonocore Porter explained in a recent
article:
For women ages twenty-five through forty-four, the key career-building
years, one in four mothers remains out of the labor force, while two in
three work less than a forty-hour week year-round. Given that only five

121. See id.
at 2227 (denouncing the falsity that part-time workers cost firms money
because savings attributed to reduced attrition rates far outweigh any arguable higher
overhead costs due to fewer billable hours).
122. See CHAMALLAS, supra note 12, at 4 (describing the idea that students should
"think like a feminist" when engaging in feminist scholarship, just as they are
instructed to "think like lawyers" in law school courses).
123. See id.at 4-13 (listing the five moves used by feminist scholars: women's
experience, implicit male bias, double binds and dilemmas of difference, reproducing
patterns of male domination, and unpacking women's choices).
124. See Nicole Buonocore Porter, Re-Defining Superwoman: An Essay on
Overcoming the "Maternal Wall" in the Legal Workplace, 13 DuKE J. GENDER &

POL'Y 55, 56 (2006) (describing the myriad situations that lead to women hitting the
maternal wall in the legal profession).
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percent of mothers aged twenty-five to forty-four work a fifty-hour week
year-round, the overwhelming majority of mothers are effectively
eliminated from 125
competing in fields that require overtime, such as the
legal profession.
These statistics show the reality for most women: they cannot perform as
an ideal worker and thus are kept from numerous career opportunities that
their male counterparts are offered. Even after returning to work full-time
after having a baby, many women face obstacles that men do not encounter
after having children. One female attorney, for example, stated "[s]ince I
came back from maternity leave, I get the work of a paralegal. I want to
say, look I had a baby, not a lobotomy."' 26 Kirleis experienced similar
stereotypes at her job after having children when male executive attorneys
took her off of important client representation and suggested that she did
not have her priorities straight. It is important to understand the
experiences of women in similar positions to raise social consciousness that
this type of behavior still occurs in the workplace and to find solutions to
these outdated stereotypes about women in their child-bearing years. More
stories such as this one need to be told, and hopefully another grassroots
movement
for a legal claim grounded in women's experience will
127
develop.

The second move by many feminists is to question the suppression of
women's experience by uncovering male bias and male norms in the rules,
12 8
standards, and concepts that appear neutral or objective on their face.
One example of implicit male bias feminist scholars have discussed is the
definitions of full-time and part-time work hours.129 When full-time hours
were set, fewer women were in the workforce and it appears as though the
forty-hour week is not objective, but is based on the number of hours per
week that were an average for men to work. This bias leads to the
disadvantage of women in the workforce because a much higher number of
women do not work forty or more hours per week, for various reasons, and
thus must be classified as part-time workers that do not qualify for many
benefits associated with full-time employment.' 30 With this feminist view
125. Id. at 60.
126. See WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 69.
127. See CHAMALLAS, supra note 12, at 5 (explaining the evolution of legal claims
based on sexual harassment from women coming forward to tell their stories about
experiences on the job).
128. See id at 6 (instructing that "implicit male bias can be revealed by examining
the real life impact of laws on women as a class, paying particular attention to how
even noncontroversial legal concepts and standards tend to disadvantage women").
129. See id. at 7.

130. See THE EDITOR'S DESK, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, AVERAGE HOURS
THAT MEN AND WOMEN WORKED IN 2008 (2009), http://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/
2009/jun/wk4/art04.htm (suggesting that women have a greater likelihood of working
part time).
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in mind, it would appear that women in the workforce already start behind
men even before having children. Then, when some women break the
mold and work over forty hours after having children, as did Kirleis, they
remain at a disadvantage because they are seen by many as breaking
approved gender role norms.
A third and extremely important move in feminist legal scholarship are
double binds and dilemmas of difference.13 1 This is the move that differs
greatly across different types of feminism as to how it deals with the
importance of differences between the sexes. The double bind mentioned
here is the exact same situation discussed previously in this paper, when
women face dilemmas in which they are forced to choose the lesser of two
evils. This double bind problem is illustrated by Ann Hopkins's
predicament to not be too aggressive as a female when the position she
wanted required aggressiveness, and also by Kirleis, where she had to
continue working long hours to be considered committed to her work,
leading her colleagues to suggest that she was not a good mother. 132 Both
of these examples show the double bind of professional women who must
conform simultaneously to conflicting stereotypes for success in their
careers. 133
The larger issue of the dilemma of differences, present in the third move,
weighs heavily on what strategy feminists use in challenging male
bias/norms and double binds that women struggle against in society. 134
Some feminists feel that gender differences between the sexes must be
addressed because pregnancy affects women more than men. The problem
with this theory is that highlighting gender differences and disparate impact
on women inherent in many laws may suggest to some that women are
inferior and in need of protection. 135 Other feminists believe that women
must be seen as equal to men in every aspect in order to achieve equality in
society in general. However, the dilemma in this is that if many rules and
norms have a male bias, ignoring gender differences will perpetuate the
cycle of disadvantaging women in all areas of the law. This paper argues
for reform of the policies and practices used in the workplace to rid them of
any male bias, for example, reforming the definition of part-time

131. See id. at 8 (pointing out the skepticism and lack of consensus in feminist
scholarship about what constitutes progress for women in search of ultimate equality
-progress that highlights gender differences or ignores them).
132. See id. at 9.
133. See id.
134. See id. at 10 (defining the dilemma of difference as the idea that "neither
ignoring nor highlighting gender will necessarily translate into progress for women,"
and suggesting that feminists must instead alter the way people think about difference
in order to reduce equating difference with inferiority).
135. See id.
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employment to remove misconceptions about part-time employees'
commitment to their work. This paper further argues, after reworking
employment practices to start all employees off equally, for an individual
assessment of each person in society, and in particular in the workplace,
and for gender differences to be less important in the overall analysis of an
individual's potential for success.
Tied to the solution of reworking employment practices to remove male
bias/norms, the fourth move used by feminist scholars in their analysis is
reproducing patterns of male domination. The double bind from move
three is an example of the phenomenon of reproducing patterns of male
dominance because it greatly affects women who do not conform to the
male norm of an ideal worker, or who do conform to that norm but are then
criticized for breaking traditional gender role expectations. 136 The double
bind has continuously reproduced male patterns of dominance by keeping
men in the most powerful positions in the workforce and keeping those
jobs out of the reach of women forced to make decisions between having a
family or a successful career. 137 Until male bias/norms are removed from
employment policies-relieving the double bind problem for many
women-women will remain disadvantaged in their careers even though
they are increasingly entering professions historically dominated by men.
The final move used by feminist scholars in analyzing legal issues from
a feminist perspective ties many of the ideas above together because they
all work jointly to inhibit the freedom with which women may make
choices, especially regarding employment decisions. It is often claimed
that women choose to leave the workforce to stay at home and take care of
children, but the truth is that many women are not completely free to make
the decision they really want.' 38 Many employers claim that it is up to the
woman, and that each woman makes her own choice of whether her family
or career is more important to her. This paper argues that this is a flawed
assumption. Women do not make their choices in a vacuum. Each choice
is made with the pressures of the workplace and society at play. Many
women choose to leave work out of guilt-imposed upon them by
employers and society in general-because of the myth that they cannot be
both good mothers and continue a demanding enough work schedule for
success in their professions. Employer policies, especially those dealing
with balanced work schedules, weigh heavily on a woman's ability to
freely make choices about whether to stay at work after bearing children.

136. See id. (identifying the difficulty of challenging gender hierarchies in
integrating occupations because they often are offset by counter-trends such as
reconfiguration of jobs).
137. See Williams, supra note 115, at 2222.
138. See CHAMALLAS, supra note 12, at 12.
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Taking into account the five moves used by feminist scholars to analyze
legal issues from a feminist perspective, this paper proposes that maternal
wall, ideal worker, and double bind issues be approached using a strategy
based on a hybrid theory made up of both liberal and individualist
feminism ideals. Women must come forward and tell their stories of
discrimination in the workplace after having children. Employment
policies and practices must be reformed on the front end to remove male
bias/norms implicit in them currently, such as the idea that part-time
workers are less committed to their jobs, that full-time female employees
do a poor job of taking care of family responsibilities, or that male
employees who request time off for family responsibilities are less able to
perform their work duties. Once inherent male bias is removed from
employment practices, a liberal/individualist feminist approach should be
utilized to evaluate each employee based on his or her individual qualities
and performance. Each employee should have an equal opportunity to earn
promotions, receive important assignments, and request leave for family
responsibilities without regard to his or her sex or family status. It is
possible to work reform into the existing system and to treat employees
equally as individuals, evaluating their merit and work, as opposed to their
sex or gender traits. If these changes occur, a decrease in cases filed for
FRD likely will follow, and working conditions will become better for both
men and women who no longer face the dilemma of choosing between a
successful career and a family.
V. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania should decide in Kirleis's favor her claims of family
responsibility and sex discrimination and of hostile work environment.
Kirleis has put forth satisfactory evidence-with the statements made to
her by male attorneys who decided on her annual compensation and work
assignments-of discrimination against her because of her sex and family
responsibilities under Title VII case law. Kirleis suffered from this
discrimination in the form of lower wages, loss of work assignments for
one of the firm's largest clients, and also loss of the ability to forge
personal and professional relationships with clients and her colleagues at
the firm.
Kirleis additionally put forth ample evidence-with the harassment she
endured at firm-sponsored events and her eventual constructive exclusion
from these events-for a finding of a hostile work environment toward her
at DMC based on her sex. Kirleis has the right, as an equal employee at the
firm, to attend firm-sponsored social and networking events. The conduct
by male attorneys at the firm who attended these events constructively
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excluded Kirleis and other female attorneys. As a result of this exclusion,
Kirleis suffered the loss of opportunities to develop personal and
professional relationships with male attorneys at the firm, including those
serving on the executive committee who made decisions about
compensation and work assignments, and also with the firm's clients that
could have further benefited her career.
The future implications of Kirleis's case can be great, especially for
other law firms and professional employers. The district court should make
sure that the correct message is sent with the outcome of this case. That
message should be that all employees, regardless of sex or family
responsibilities, have the right to be treated equally. Employment decisions
should be based on merit alone, on an individualized basis, and not based
on preconceived notions regarding how a person belonging to a certain
group should act in the workplace. No matter what a woman's title or
profession may be, she should have every opportunity to achieve and
maintain the same success as the men around her to the best of her abilities.
To make sure that employers understand the gravity of their employment
decisions and the manner with which they choose to treat all of their
employees, the district court should render a decision holding DMC liable
for the losses suffered by Kirleis due to the firm's practice of
discrimination and hostility toward women who continued to work at the
firm after having children.

